After the Second World War, many Western countries gradually established a system of welfare state. It is the state that provided infrastructures such as roads, green spaces, and public facilities by means of taxation. As public expenditure continued to expand and public administration became increasingly redundant in the 1970s, there arose ideas of “neoliberalism” that argued for replacing the state with the private sector to provide public goods and services.

Planning gain agreements flourished in such a context. The agreements, in general, are a means by which the government (i.e., local planning authorities) procures benefits from developers when granting them developing permissions. For example, a planning authority can require a developer to build supporting facilities such as schools and community centers when giving it permission to construct residential buildings. In so doing, public service facilities can be built without much funding from the government, and developers can also obtain sufficient profits. In addition, local planning authorities attempt to deliver more equitable planning outcomes by delegating certain power to communities.

The expected positive outcomes from planning gain agreements, however, are challenged by findings of this study. Researchers interviewed 80 participants selected from four groups in Ireland: 1) local planning officials, 2) councillors, 3) developers, and 4) community interest groups. Based on these interviews, the study demonstrates that developers have been enabled by planning gain agreements to infiltrate the political sphere in subtle and implicit ways unmatched by those in the past. These agreements have even become a mechanism manipulated by power and capital. Therefore, existing unequal distribution of power among communities, the government, and developers has not been redressed by planning gain agreements. The agreements have, instead, preserved and even consolidated existing power imbalances by driving a large-scale upward mobility of wealth within the society.

This case has some important implications for community building in China. The country is facing a critical era of deeper reform in which the rhetoric of privatization, albeit nonmainstream, has never ceased. The Irish case shows that institutional arrangements oriented toward privatization may not empower communities, a party that has less power than the government and developers. Rather, such arrangements tend to enable developers to form closer partnership with the government, thus exacerbating existing power imbalances and further harming the interests of communities.