Conflicts over land requisition in China’s urban-rural peripheries have contributed to the country’s complex relations between the state and the village. Village collectives often have to navigate through the tensions between the expectation of villagers from land development (i.e., obtaining more power and interests) and that of the local state (i.e., attracting investment). Under the surface of resistance, conflicts, negotiations, and coordination regarding land requisition is the restructuring of China’s state-village power relations. This case is derived from Guangzhou’s Luogang District (now part of Huangpu District). It sheds light not only on how villagers influence the ways in which local government behaves, but also on how government’s behaviors shape village collectives.

The macro-level context of this case is the diminishing of the dual state-village structure with China’s transition to a market economy. This change is marked by an increasingly important role of open market in the process of land requisition. Following the logic of market economy, villagers make different requests at different periods of time, and channels for their request making have also been diversified. As can be expected, villagers’ negotiation power has been greatly increased, thus demanding more response from local state.

This case demonstrates that villagers’ requests have led to various policy responses from Guangzhou municipal government. For example, in the 1980s the government offered villagers different kinds of financial compensation, and even non-agricultural hukou. Since the 1990s, villagers’ requests have changed mainly due to decrease in the attractiveness of non-agricultural hukou and increase in land value. The government, accordingly, formulated a policy regarding reserved commercial land that has the potential of generating income for the village collective. The income not only has enabled the village to provide social welfare (e.g., medical care and education) to villagers, but also has reduced the government’s fiscal burden. Noteworthy in these changing policy responses is that the local government has changed from acting as a ‘player-and-referee’ in villages’ specific economic affairs to acting only as a ‘referee’ particularly by township/district government’s relinquishing its shared ownership of village collective assets. This identity change has enhanced township/district government’s credibility among villagers, which in turn has enabled the government to intervene in village public affairs.

This case also shows that changes in government’s behaviors have increased village cohesion. Now that a village’s income relies on effective management of its collective assets, villagers are highly motivated to participate in this process. It should be noted that their participation has further contributed to village self-governance.