How do local governments in China effectively manage and control suburban communities?
中国的地方政府是如何有效治理城郊社区？

It is generally assumed that serious social conflicts can result from China’s rapid urbanization. This assumption is mainly underpinned by three factors: 1) conflicts between externally arranged economic development plans and villagers’ interests, 2) corruption in local governments, and 3) inaccessibility of high-quality public goods and public services to residents of urbanizing villages. Nonetheless, the assumption has been mainly countered in China. This article attempts to offer an explanation, namely that Chinese local governments have realized effective governance of many urbanizing villages with various methods. The case is derived from Guangzhou’s Luogang District (now part of Huangpu District).
一般认为，高速城市化过程中，外部安排的经济发展计划往往与村民的利益相矛盾，加上地方政府腐败等问题，使得城市化村庄的村民不能获得良好的公共产品和公共服务，并造成严重的社会冲突。但是，中国的城市化仍在以惊人的速度进行，并且没有导致严重的社会冲突，这是什么原因？本文基于对广州市萝岗区（现黄埔区）地方政府日常管理实践的长期跟踪研究，探索了中国地方政府对快速城市化村庄实现有效治理的方法。 地方政府通过社会福利供给、股份制改革、基层组织选举干预等措施，实现了对城市化村庄的有效治理。将国家支持的福利系统引入村庄，缓解了村民对征地的抵抗。

Luogang District government has adopted three main methods. The first is to introduce state-supported social welfare system to urbanizing villages, the introduction that tends to have reduced villagers’ resistance to land requisitions. It is noteworthy that the government provides public goods and public services to the villagers mainly by the revenues generated from their collective assets and land, particularly from their “reserved development land” – the land that can be legally used for non-farming purposes (e.g., office buildings, factories, and storage buildings). Collective assets management and revenue distribution, therefore, have become sources of conflicts between villagers and villagers’ committee. Villagers’ consequent mistrust of the committee has paved the way for their welcome to Luogang District government’s intervention in their village governance. The second method is that of shareholding reforms. These reforms have effectively held villagers’ committee accountable by combining the supervision of district government and that of villagers as shareholders. The third method is that of intervention in elections of members of village Party committee. The intervention has enabled the district government to exert indirect influence on Villagers’ Committee and shareholding cooperatives. More importantly, it has given villagers a stronger impression of democracy and equality in the governance of their local affairs.
地方政府通过设置自留建设用地（自留建设用地可以合法的用于非农业用途，例如办公、工厂、仓储等）使村民分享土地增值收益，并以集体资产收入为基础向村民提供了公共产品和公共服务。不过，在这个过程中，集体资产管理和集体收益分配又成为村民和村干部冲突的来源，例如村干部贪污腐败、外嫁女被取消股权等。正因为村民不信任村干部，使得地方政府更有权威并有机会介入村庄治理。并使村民乐意接受国家介入村庄治理。通过股份制改革，将地方政府监督指导和村民（股东）监督结合，对村干部形成有效激励和约束；通过对村党委会选举的控制，间接实现对居民委员会和股份合作社的干预，并给村民传递更民主和公平的感觉。

This case also raises three further questions about governance of urbanizing villages. First, how can minority groups’ interests be better protected from dominant groups in a kinship-based village? Second, how can a balance be struck between local state interventions and villagers’ self-governance? Third, how can villagers’ income and social welfare be better secured when their reserved development land is adversely affected by economic downturn?
在村集体利益分享和村干部权利约束共同作用下，地方政府成功介入到了村庄公共事务中，并实现了对村庄的有效治理。然而，在宗族势力大的地区，如何避免强势宗族对少数村民利益的侵害？如何在政府干预和村民自治中找到平衡点？这些仍然是需要关注的问题。此外，城市化村庄的村民因分享土地增值收益而“衣食不愁”，但是如果遭遇经济下行或产业衰败，进而集体资产收益骤减，这些村民的福利和收入如何保障？这类问题可能需要进一步关注。