How does land requisitions restructure state-village power?
征地如何改变了政府与村庄之间的权力关系？

Conflicts over land requisition in China’s urban-rural peripheries have contributed to the country’s complex relations between the state and the village. Village collectives often have to navigate through the tensions between the expectation of villagers from land development (i.e., obtaining more power and interests) and that of the local state (i.e., attracting investment). Under the surface of resistance, conflicts, negotiations, and coordination regarding land requisition is the restructuring of China’s state-village power relations. This case is derived from Guangzhou’s Luogang District (now part of Huangpu District). It sheds light not only on how villagers influence the ways in which local government behaves, but also on how government’s behaviors shape village collectives.
征地和反抗征地的冲突在城郊农村不断上演，由此形成了政府和村庄之间的复杂关系。村民希望获得更多权力和利益、政府希望开发土地以吸引投资、村庄集体则有复杂的定位。在以冲突、反抗、沟通、协调等为表征的事件背后，政府和村庄之间的权力关系在重构。村民如何影响了政府行为，政府的行为又如何形塑了村庄集体？广州市萝岗区（现黄埔区）的案例很有代表性。

The macro-level context of this case is the diminishing of the dual state-village structure with China’s transition to a market economy. This change is marked by an increasingly important role of open market in the process of land requisition. Following the logic of market economy, villagers make different requests at different periods of time, and channels for their request making have also been diversified. As can be expected, villagers’ negotiation power has been greatly increased, thus demanding more response from local state.
地方政府回应被征地村民诉求的策略取得了很好地效果，而村民诉求的产生离不开市场化改革的时代背景。在这一背景下，政府政策中的市场部分扩大，这使原有的城乡二元结构慢慢消融。与这个过程相伴的是村民的诉求变化，及村民提出诉求的渠道多样化，这提高了村民和村庄集体谈判的实力，从而使地方政府更有必要回应村民的诉求。可以说，政府和村庄之间权利重构的过程也是中国经济政策大环境变化的微观缩影。

This case demonstrates that villagers’ requests have led to various policy responses from Guangzhou municipal government. For example, in the 1980s the government offered villagers different kinds of financial compensation, and even non-agricultural hukou. Since the 1990s, villagers’ requests have changed mainly due to decrease in the attractiveness of non-agricultural hukou and increase in land value. The government, accordingly, formulated a policy regarding reserved commercial land that has the potential of generating income for the village collective. The income not only has enabled the village to provide social welfare (e.g., medical care and education) to villagers, but also has reduced the government’s fiscal burden. Noteworthy in these changing policy responses is that the local government has changed from acting as a ‘player-and-referee’ in villages’ specific economic affairs to acting only as a ‘referee’ particularly by township/district government’s relinquishing its shared ownership of village collective assets. This identity change has enhanced township/district government’s credibility among villagers, which in turn has enabled the government to intervene in village public affairs.
在不同时期，地方政府采取了不同的政策来满足被征地村民的诉求。例如，1980年代，地方政府除了给村民经济补偿，还通过给予城市户口来激励村民“洗脚上田”。1990年代后，城市户口的吸引力降低而土地价值上升，为回应村民诉求，政府出台了保留商业用地政策。保留商业用地给村庄集体带来了收入，从而为村庄自主供给村民社会福利包（包括医疗、教育等）提供了支持，并减轻了地方政府的财政负担。在如上政策变化过程中，地方政府逐渐从具体的村庄经济事务中抽身，从原来的“远动员”兼“裁判员”身份，变为纯粹的“裁判员”身份（例如，乡镇放弃了对集体资产的共有权利）。身份的变化使地方政府在村民中更有威信，并得以顺利介入到村庄的公共事务中。

This case also shows that changes in government’s behaviors have increased village cohesion. Now that a village’s income relies on effective management of its collective assets, villagers are highly motivated to participate in this process. It should be noted that their participation has further contributed to village self-governance.
与此同时，村庄作为一个整体，变得更加紧密。由于村庄集体收入依赖于集体资产的有效管理，这导致村民对集体资产管理有很高的参与积极性，进而促进了村庄自治的发展。