Why do communities benefit little from privatization reforms?
为什么私有化改革无法使得社区从中收益？

After the Second World War, many Western countries gradually established a system of welfare state. It is the state that provided infrastructures such as roads, green spaces, and public facilities by means of taxation. As public expenditure continued to expand and public administration became increasingly redundant in the 1970s, there arose ideas of “neoliberalism” that argued for replacing the state with the private sector to provide public goods and services.
第二次世界大战以后，西方国家逐渐建立起完善的福利国家制度。诸如道路、绿地、公共设施等基础设施建设通常由国家征税后统一提供。随着国家福利开支的日益庞大，国家机构的日渐臃肿，20世纪70年代开始，西方国家兴起了“新自由主义”思潮，主张由更加高效的私营部门取代国家来提供公共产品和服务。

Planning gain agreements flourished in such a context. The agreements, in general, are a means by which the government (i.e., local planning authorities) procures benefits from developers when granting them developing permissions. For example, a planning authority can require a developer to build supporting facilities such as schools and community centers when giving it permission to construct residential buildings. In so doing, public service facilities can be built without much funding from the government, and developers can also obtain sufficient profits. In addition, local planning authorities attempt to deliver more equitable planning outcomes by delegating certain power to communities.
规划得益协议（Planning gain agreements）正是在这一背景下蓬勃发展。规划得益协议通常是指政府（市政规划部门）在向房地产开发商授予建设许可时，向开发商收取利益的一种方式。例如规划部门要求开发商在建设住宅楼的同时建设学校、社区中心等配套设施。通过这种方式，不需政府大量投入，公共服务设施能得以兴建，开发商也可以获得足够的收益。为了保证当地社区的利益，政府还通过授权当地社区确保更公正的规划成果。

The expected positive outcomes from planning gain agreements, however, are challenged by findings of this study. Researchers interviewed 80 participants selected from four groups in Ireland: 1) local planning officials, 2) councillors, 3) developers, and 4) community interest groups. Based on these interviews, the study demonstrates that developers have been enabled by planning gain agreements to infiltrate the political sphere in subtle and implicit ways unmatched by those in the past. These agreements have even become a mechanism manipulated by power and capital. Therefore, existing unequal distribution of power among communities, the government, and developers has not been redressed by planning gain agreements. The agreements have, instead, preserved and even consolidated existing power imbalances by driving a large-scale upward mobility of wealth within the society.
但是本文基于对80位爱尔兰规划师、议员、开发商和社区团体的访谈，认为规划收益协议使得开发商以比以往任何时候都更加微妙和含蓄地渗透到政治领域，协议逐渐沦为了一种被权力和资本操纵的机制。因此，社区相较于政府和开发商的权力不平等非但没有消除，反而财富大规模向上转移，又进一步维护和加强了现有权力的不平衡。

This case has some important implications for community building in China. The country is facing a critical era of deeper reform in which the rhetoric of privatization, albeit nonmainstream, has never ceased. The Irish case shows that institutional arrangements oriented toward privatization may not empower communities, a party that has less power than the government and developers. Rather, such arrangements tend to enable developers to form closer partnership with the government, thus exacerbating existing power imbalances and further harming the interests of communities.
这个案例所包含的国际经验对于我国的社区建设有着借鉴意义。中国正面临进一步深化改革的关口时期，尽管不是主流意见，但是进一步进行私有化的论调从未停息。本文以发达国家的实际经验表明了私有化的制度安排不但无法增加相对弱势的社区的权力，反而使得开发商进一步和政治权力相结合，从而使得三者的权力关系更加不平衡，最终进一步损害社区的利益。